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I. MAJOR FEATURES OF THE NEW ACT
In the closing days of the 1961 session of the North Dakota
Legislative Assembly, after a good deal of parliamentary manuev-
ering involving a number of companion measures,' enacted a com-
prehensive labor relations statute 2 broadly patterned after the model
of the National Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,2' as cur-
rently amended.
4
Originally proposed by an interim committee5 which had studied
the problems of labor relations in this state for the better part of a
year, the passage of the North Dakota Labor-Management Rela-
lations Act of 1961 undoubtedly represented one of the most signi-
ficant achievements of the 1961 legislature. This is so for a number
of reasons. In the past this state has operated on the basis of a
set of labor enactments which, whatever their intrinsic merit, lay
outside the main stream of contemporary developments so far as
relations between employers and employees were concerned. More,-
over, as applied to labor disputes the former statutes were of
relatively limited coverage, 7 so that comparatively few practitioners
in this jurisdiction enjoyed the opportunity for inducement to de-
velop expertise in what is actually one of the most meaningful of
all legal fields. While the virtues and defects of the new statute
Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. The views expressed in this paper
are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Special
Committee to Study Labor Laws.
1. The most prominent of these was a measure creating a separate department of
labor, which failed to pass.
2. H.B. 831, N.D. Legislative Assembly (1961), hereinafter cited as the "North Dakota
Labor-Management Relations Act."
3. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1958) (Taft-Hartley).
4. See Title VII, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat.
541 (1959).
5. This was the Special Committee to Study Labor Laws. Members of the committee
were Representative Ralph Beede, Chairman; Senator Edwin C. Beeker, Senator Ralph J.
Erickstad, Senator 0. S. Johnson, Representative Gordon S. Aamoth, Representative Kenneth
C. Lowe, Representative Bruce M. Van Sickle, Mr. George Dixon, Frank F. Jestrab, Esq.,
Mr. William W. Murrey, and Philip B. Vogel, Esq. Mr. James Marsden, Mr. H. B. Martin-
son, and David Weinberg, Esq., materially aided the Committee in its deliberations. The
initial draft of the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act was prepared by Frank
F. Jestrab. The author had the privilege of serving as counsel to the Committee.
6. See Killingsworth, State Labor Relations Act 1-3 (1948). "As a matter of fact, in
1947, nearly 40 states lacked labor agencies and comprehensive labor legislation." Mr.
Justice Burton, dissenting in Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
7. It has been said that in states following the former North Dakota pattern of labor
legislation the laws "are aimed exclusively at one or a few union practices, place few or
no restrictions on employers, and do not attempt to establish a comprehensive labor relations
policy. In virtually all states with such union-regulatory laws, no cases at all or only test
cases have arisen." Killingsworth, op. cit. supra note 6, at 3.
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invite careful examination," it nevertheless represents at a minimum
a break in this fundamental pattern. As a result, the attorney who
comes in contact with a North Dakota labor problem in the future
will find ready at hand a number of new legal tools, already tested
on the federal level, which were not previously available in this
state. Among these may be listed a newly-imposed duty resting
on both labor and management to participate in the collective
bargaining process;9 explicit statutory recognition, raised for the
first time in this state to the level of a jurally significant right,"'
of the freedom of employees to organize and to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing;1' a definition of
unfair labor practices, believed to be considerably more meaning-
ful than past enactments, specifying conduct in which neither labor
nor management is privileged to engage;' 2 improved procedures
for the determination of questions or representation and appropriate
bargaining units;1" and a considerably greater right of practical
access to the courts than was enjoyed previously."4
These represent, it is believed, a substantial alteration in the
substantive jurisprudence of this state dealing with labor relations.
The proven utility of these features undoubtedly accounts for the
substantially bipartisan support which the statute enjoyed during
the course of its passage.2 5 But even more fundamentally the Act
is believed to represent a reasoned response to developments in
labor laws on the federal level which have imposed new responsi-
bilities on the states. Thus it furnishes reassuring evidence of the
continued ability of this state to face the challenge of new condi-
ditions.
II. THE FEDERAL BACKGROUND
Since the changes which occurred on the federal level were in
many respects the key to the adoption of the new Act, some ex-
8. "It is relevant to recall that the Taft-Hartley Act was, to a marked degree, the result
of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views on the
role of organized labor in the free economic life of the Nation and the appropriate balance
to be struck between the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their re-
spective intrests." Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board, 357 U.S.
93, 99-100 (1958).
9. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 4.
10. Under prior North Dakota statutes the right of employee organization was declared
to be favored as a matter of public policy but was not judicially enforceable. N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 34-08-02, 34-09,01.
11. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 2.
12. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3.
13. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 5-7.
14. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 8, 10, 11.
15. It might be noted in passing that the Special Committee to Study Labor Laws was
appointed by a Republican Governor and that the North Dakota Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act which the Committee recommended was approved by a Democratic one. The Act
itself passed both houses of the Legislative Assembly by wide margins and party-lines did
not appear to be relevant in respect to it.
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ploration of the relationship between federal and state law in the
field of labor relations appears justified.
Prior to 1959 the Supreme Court of the United States had ruled
in numerous cases that the states were without authority to regu-
late or intervene in labor disputes involving business enterprises
engaged in interstate commerce.16 This denial of state jurisdiction
was substantially complete, the only exception of genuine signifi-
cance arising in situations wherein a labor controversy was "marked
by violence and imminent threats to the public order."z The
practical result of this situation was that while the North Dakota
courts could grant relief when a labor dispute threatened the peace
of the community wherein it arose," they were without authority
to assist in the resolution of peaceful disputes arising in this state
so long as the dispute concerned a business of interstate character."9
The basis for the foregoing holdings was to be found in the
doctrine of pre-emption, i.e., the principle that under the suprem-
acy clause of the United States Constitution 2° a federal statute
regulating a particular subject matter supersedes state legislation
dealing with the same problem.2'1 This was, and for that matter
still is, a doctrine of great importance in the field of state labor
legislation; for it is clear that when the Congress enacted the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 it intended - in the
view of most commentators unwisely22 - to exercise the full scope
of its power over commerce among the states to the exclusion of
state enactments in the field. So sweeping was the pre-emption,
indeed, that the state courts were not even authorized to enforce
the federal law, a point thoroughly expounded in Garner v. Team-
sters Union23 by Mr. Justice Jackson:
16. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Guss v. Utah
Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Teamsters Union v. N.Y., N.H., & H. Ry., 350 U.S. 155
(1956); Weber v. Annheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
17. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959). See also
United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Construction Workers
v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
18. Minor v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
19. Northern Improvement Co. v. St. Peter, 74 N.W.2d 100 (N.D. 1955).
20. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
he bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding." U.S. Const., Art VI, § 2.
21. For more detailed discussion of pre-emption as it applies to labor relations, see Cox,
Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1297 (1954); Hall, The Taft-
Hartley Act v. State Regulation, 1 J. Pub. L. 97 (1952); Hays, Federalism and Labor Re-
lations in the United States, U. Pa. L. Rev. 959 (1954); Ratner, Problems of Federal-State
Jurisdiction in Labor Relations, 3 Lab. L. J. 750 (1952); Rose, The Labor Management
Relations Act and the State's Power to Grant Relief, 39 Va. L. Rev. 765 (1953); Young-
dahl, Federal Limitations on State Jurisdiction Over Labor-Management Reltations, 12 Ark.
L. Rev. 354 (1958).
22. See Cox, supra note 21, at 1304-05.
23. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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"Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law
to be enforced by an tribunal competent to apply law generally
to the parties. It went on to confide primary interpretation
and application of its rules to a specific and specially consti-
tuted tribunal and prescribed a particular procedure for investi-
gation, complaint and notice, bearing and decision, including
judicial relief pending a final administrative order. Congress
evidently considered that centralized administration of specially
designed procedures was necessary to obtain uniform applica-
tion of its substantive rules and to avoid these diversities and
conflicts likely to result from a variety of local procedures and
attitudes toward labor controversies . . . A multiplicity of tri-
bunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules
of substantive law."24
In practice, however, the device of making the National Labor
Relations Board the only forum for adjudication of a labor dispute
involving interstate commerce ultimately proved unworkable.-
While the NLRB possessed technical authority over all such dis-
putes to the exclusion of the states, it was found impracticable for
the agency to exercise its jurisdiction to the full measure, if only
for the reason that the appropriations and personnel at its disposal
were inadequate to carry the complete case load. Thus the NLRB
developed a policy of declining to accept jurisdiction in cases it
considered of insufficient importance to warrant its intervention.
Chief Justice Warren has described this phase of the history of the
Board as follows:
"For a number of years, the Board decided case-by-case
whether to take jurisdiction. In 1950, concluding that 'exper-
ience warrants the establishment and announcement of certain
standards' to govern the exercise of its jurisdiction . . . the
Board published standards, largely in terms of yearly dollar
amounts of interstate inflow and outflow."-"
This was an administrative policy of extra-legal character, un-
authorized by the terms of any statute. Warren was careful to
note, in discussing it, that the Supreme Court had never passed on
the validity of the jurisdictional standards thus laid down.
The establishment of these standards had, however, an unex-
pected consequence. It presently became apparent that they had
the effect of dividing labor disputes into three broad categories:
24. Id. at 490-91.
25. This was noted as early as 1954. "In exercising its new function Congress has made
.what has proved in experience to be an unsatisfactory allocation of power as between state
and Federal Government. The problem of re-allocation is now before it as possibly the
most important problem in labor relations facing the country today." Hays, supra note 21,
at 961.
26. Guss v. Utah Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1957).
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(1) cases involving interstate commerce which the NLRB was will-
ing to adjudicate; (2) cases involving interstate commerce which
the NLRB was not willing to adjudicate; and (3) cases involving
intrastate commerce which fell within the purview of state authority.
And the status of labor disputes falling in the second category -
group (2), above - rapidly proved anomalous. Cases soon arose
in which employers and employees who could not obtain relief
from the NLRB because their dispute was not one which fell within
the scope of the federal agency's jurisdictional yardsticks sought
assistance from state boards even though the dispute technically
involved a business in interstate commerce. Faced with this situ-
ation the states reached varying results. Some state courts came to
the forthright conclusion that the states were free to assert jurisdic-
tion and to apply their own law in any labor dispute wherein the
NLRB was unwilling to act.' 7 This was a result based on the argu-
ment there could be no interference with federal labor policy as a
result of state action if the federal government itself had refused
to rule on the case. 28 Conversely, other courts concluded that even
though the NLRB had declined to adjudicate a dispute the states
were without power to intervene in it so long as the controversy
involved commerce of an interstate character. 29 Underlying this
position was the basic question of what body of law - state or
federal - was applicable to the dispute; the courts reaching the
latter result reasoned that if the dispute affected interstate com-
merce the substantive rights of the parties were determined by the
federal statute, which they were powerless to apply, and hence that
state law could not logically be used for the resolution of the dis-
pute.
30
In 1957 this situation came to a head in Guss v. Utah Labor
Board,31 which focussed national attention on the problem. Guss
was a Utah manufacturer of photographic supplies engaged in
27. Garnon v. San Diego Building Trades Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1 (1955),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 26 (1957); Building Trades Council v. Bonito, 71 Nev. 84, 280 P.2d 295
(1955); Hammer v. Local 211, United Textile Workers, 34 N.J. Super. 34,111 A.2d 308
(1954); Dallas General Drivers v. Jax Beer Co., 276 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
28. Thus the Supreme Court of California stated that: "A remedy under federal laws
available to an injured party may justify pre-emption of the field of labor relations, but
.when the application of that rule would result in the loss of all protection, there is no
reason to bar state courts from providing relief." Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades
Council, 45 Cal.2d 657, 291 P.2d 1, 5 (1955), rev'd, 353 U.S. 26 (1957). See also Ham-
mer v. Local 211, United Textile Workers, 34 N.J. Super. 34, 111 A.2d 308, 317-18
(1954).
2. Retail Clerks v. Your Food Stores, 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955); New York Labor
Board v. Wage Transportation System, 130 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1954), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 883,
134 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1954).
30. See New York Labor Board v. Wage Transportation System, 130 N.Y.S.2d 731,
750 (1954).
31. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
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interstate commerce. In 1953 the plant employees, through their
union, filed unfair labor practice charges against Guss with the
National Labor Relations Board. Pursuant to its jurisdictional
standards the NLRB declined to rule upon the case, whereupon the
union filed the same charges with a state agency, the Utah Labor
Board. Utah possesses a state labor relations act -' closely resemb-
ling a pioneering enactment of Wisconsin 3 and the union got the
relief it wanted; a remedial order was issued by the Utah Labor
Board and affirmed by the Utah Supreme Court.3" Guss then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, raising the basic
point that since it was in interstate commerce the state lacked
jurisdiction to apply its law to the dispute. Though recognizing
that the practical result of its ruling was to create a legal vacuum
in the field of labor relations - an area where neither state nor
federal law was applicable - the Court nevertheless found itself
constrained to rule that the objection to the state's jurisdiction was
well taken. "Since Congress' power in the area of commerce among
the states is plenary," observed Chief justice Warren, "its judgment
must be respected whatever policy objections there may be to
creation of a no-man's land."35
Because the decision left a substantial number 36 of labor disputes
to what was, in effect, the law of the economic jungle, it was by
no means well received. Remedial action eventually came on sev-
eral fronts. On August 1, 1959, the National Labor Relations Board
amended its jurisdictional standards so that additional cases could
be heard.3 7 And shortly thereafter, in passing the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the Congress inserted
the following amendment to the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947:
"(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision
or by published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute involving any class or category of employers where,
in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute
on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant the ex-
ercise of its jurisdiction; Provided, that the Board shall not
32. Utah Code § 34-1-1 et seq. (1953).
33. Wis. Stat. §§ 111.1 - 111.19 (1957). See Lampert, The Wisconsin Labor Peace
Act, 1946 Wis. L. Rev. 193.
34. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 5 Utah 2d 68, 296 P.2d 733 (1956).
35. 353 U.S. at 11.
36. "How many labor disputes the Board's 1954 standards leave in the 'twilight zone'
between exercised federal jurisdiction and unquestioned state jurisdiction is not known. In
any case, there has recently been a substantial volume of litigation raising the question .
Warren, C.J., in Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
37. See infra, pp ..........
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decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which
it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon
August 1, 1959.
"(2) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prevent or bar
any agency or the courts of any State or Territory . . . from
assuming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over
which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this
subsection, to assert jurisdiction.""8
The effect of the foregoing language is to vest in the states juris-
diction to hear and to decide, pursuant to their own law, all cases
involving labor disputes which the NLRB declines to entertain. It
should be observed that under the terms of the enactment just
quoted the NLRB is free to increase its own jurisdiction, but may
not decrease it beyond the present limits without the consent of
the Congress.
III. THE N.L.R.B. JURISDICTION STANDARDS
The substance of the NLRB jurisdictional standards which took
effect August 1, 1959, is presented here for convenience. 39  They
provide in substance that the National Labor Relations Board will
assume jurisdiction in the case of labor disputes involving:
(a) Non-retail business -if the yearly outflow or inflow of
goods or services, direct or indirect, is $50,000.40
(b) Office buildings - if (1) gross yearly revenue is $100,000
and (2) $25,000 of the revenue is derived from organizations which
meet any of the jurisdictional yardsticks.
(c) Retail concerns - if the gross yearly volume of business is
$500,000.
(d) Instrumentalities, links, and channels of interstate com-
merce -- if (1) $50,000 yearly revenue is derived from the inter-
state or linkage part of the enterprise, or (2) $50,000 yearly revenue
is derived from services performed for employers in interstate
commerce.
(e) Public utilities - if (1) gross yearly volume of business is
38. 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 2§ U.S.C.A. § 164 (c) (1)(2).
39. See NLRB Press Release R-576, Current Jurisdictional Yardsticks, Oct. 2, 1958;
CCH Lab. L. Guide 1022. As to judicial notice of the yardsticks, see Dallas General
Drivers v. Jax Beer Co., 276 S.W.2d 384, 389-90 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 31-10-02 (1). The practitioner is advised to consult NLRB Reg. § 101.40 et.
seq., 29 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1960), for informal NLRB procedures relating to jurisdictional
determination.
40. It should be noted that inflow and outflow across a state line cannot be added
together in order to meet-the -$50.,000 figure. -This is true Tegardless of whether such inflow
or outflow is !direct or indirect. Outflow is direct if it consists of goods shipped or services
furnished by the employer outside the state, and is indirect if the employer makes sales
within the state to users meeting any jurisdictional standard. Inflow is dierct if goods or
services are furnished directly to the employer from outside the state wherein he is located,
and is indirect if goods or services originated outside the employer's state but were pur-
chased by him from a seller within the state.
1961]
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$250,000, or outflow or inflow, direct or indirect, is $50,000; (2) the
standard for non-retail concerns is met, namely a yearly outflow
or inflow, direct or indirect, of $50,000.
(f) Transit systems, except taxicabs - if the gross yearly vol-
ume of business is $250,000.
(g) Taxicab firms - if the standard for retail concerns is met,
i.e., a gross yearly volume of $50,000.
(h) Newspapers - if the gross yearly volume of business is
$200,000 and the newspapers subscribes to interstate wire services,
publishes nationally syndicated features, or advertises nationally
sold products.
(i) Communications systems (radio, television, telegraph and
telephone) - if the gross yearly volume of business is $100,000.
(j) National defense - if there is a substantial impact on na-
tional defense.
(k) Hotels and motels (except residential) - if the gross yearly
volume of business is $500,000.'
Labor disputes involving business falling outside the above cate-
gories are presently subject to the jurisdiction of the state of North
Dakota. It will be observed that as a practical matter many of the
listings above possess a considerable significance for this state,
since - as an illustration - it seems doubtful there are many hotels
or retail establishments in this area grossing $10,000 per week,
which is the approximate average required for invocation of NLRB
authority.
IV. NORTH DAKOTA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
In considering problems of labor law the existence of certain pro-
visions of the state constitution should not be overlooked. Broadly
speaking, the regulation of labor relations by statute is an exercise
of the state's authority to legislate for the protection of the public
health, welfare, safety and morals, 42 and the basic constitutional
justification of the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act
would appear to rest on that ground. In this connection it should
be borne in mind that while the federal government is possessed
of delegated powers the state governments are governments of
reserved powers.43 Hence the relevant inquiry from the standpoint
41. A residential hotel or motel is one in which at least 75 per cent of the guests re-
sided therein for a month or more during the preceding year. CCH Lab. L. Guide 1022.
42. 11 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law § 345, citing numerous authorities.
43. Martin v. Tyler, 4 N.D. 278, 288, 60 N.W. 392, 395 (1894): "He who would
challenge a legislative enactment must be able to specify the particular constitutional pro-
vision that deprived the legislature of the power to pass the enactment."
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of state constitutional law is not whether a constitution authorizes
a given enactment, but whether the constitution prohibits it.4
At the North Dakota Constitutional Convention of 1889 there
were adopted constitutional provisions safeguarding the right to
obtain and hold employment freely and without malicious interfer-
ence, forbidding certain forms of child labor, allowing the estab-
lishment of special tribunals of conciliation to deal with labor dis-
putes, and prohibiting the practice of black listing.
Of these various provisions, it is undoubtedly § 23 of the North
Dakota Constitution which is of the greatest interest, inasmuch as
§ 2 of the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act utilizes
at least some language of a broadly analogous character. As orig-
inally submitted to the Convention, § 23 of the Constitution was
broadly aimed at the practice of black listing. The section was
offered by Mr. Parsons of Morton County, a delegate active in
labor matters on behalf of railroad workers, and originally provided
that:
"Every citizen of this state shall be free to obtain employment
wherever possible, and any person, corporation or agent there-
of keeping a black list, interfering or hindering in any way a
citizen from obtaining or enjoying employment already ob-
tained, from any other corporation or person, shall be deemed
guilty of conspiracy against the welfare of the state, which
offense shall be punished as prescribed by law.
" 4
5
Vigorous objection was promptly made. "Every town in the
country," declared a delegate speaking in opposition, "has its black
list. Every merchant has his black list, and they post one another
as to who is entitled to credit and who is not. All through this
land there are black lists, and it seems to me that while we hold
railroads and other corporations liable for the damage they may
do, I cannot see why they should not be entitled to warn one an-
other against all the dangerous men that they have had experience
with.""' Speaking to the same point, other delegates were equally
vigorous. "When a railroad company has found that one of its em-
ployees is inefficient, incompetent or a habitual drunkard, is it not
right to put him on a list and say to its own managers and the man-
agers of every other railroad corporation - this man we have found
to be a habitual drunkard, or he is color blind, and cannot safely
act as an engineer?"
47
44. State ex. rel. Rausch v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 78 N.D. 247, 49 N.W.2d 14
(1951); Stark v. City of Jamestown, 76 N.D. 422, 37 N.W.2d 516 (1949).
45. Debates, North Dakota Constitutional Convention 365 (1889).
46. Id. at 366.
47. Id. at 368.
1961]
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This was sufficient to indicate that the proposal was in for some
heavy going. Nevertheless, the proponents of the measure won the
day temporarily on the plea that incompetency was not the true
reason for the existence of the black list. "Nothing in this clause,"
asserted Parson, "interferes with or trammels the right of the em-
ployer to write or inquire all over the United States as to the
character of the applicant, but it is intended to make the circulation
of the black list a crime, and most of the names on these black lists
are there for political offenses. It has become tyrannical . . ."4s
But although this sufficed to get the proposal past its first reading
before a sparsely-attended session,4" the opposition had the votes
when the measure once again reached the floor and were, in ad-
dition, armed with an adverse report on the proposal from the
committee to which it had been commended. The argument made
against the section was that since a workman whose name was
wrongfully inscribed on a black list had the right to sue for libel,
the section was in conflict with other provisions of the Constitution
dealing with the right to recover for defamation. 0 This view im-
pressed the Convention, and Parsons' original proposal was defeated
by a substantial margin. At that point a substitute was offered by
William Lauder of Wahpeton, an attorney:
"Every citizen of this State shall be free to obtain employ-
ment wherever possible, and any person, corporation or agent
thereof interfering or hindering in any way a citizen from ob-
taining or enjoying employment already obtained from any
other corporation or person shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor and shall be punished as shall be perscribed by law.""
This served to provoke an intriguing parliamentary encounter
as well as to provide what is probably the most relevant portion of
the provision's legislative history. A motion was promptly made
to lay Lauder's substitute on the table, whereupon Lauder, appar-
ently ignoring the point that the motion to table was not debatable,
rose to debate it anyway.
"It seems to me," Lauder declared, "that there is a disposition
here to enforce a sort of gag rule. I hope every member of this
convention will study this section - look it over carefully, and
see, satisfy yourselves, if you can, that there is nothing wrong about
it. It provides that every citizen shall be free to obtain employment
48. Id. at 369.
49. "It seems to me that this is one of the most important articles we have had under
consideration, and I am very sorry that it comes up now that the House is so empty." Id.
at 366.
50. Id. at 533.
51. Id. at 537.
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wherever possible. That protects a man who is seeking employment
from interference by those who are on strike, or who would prevent
it. 'Any person, corporation or agent thereof, interfering or hinder-
ing in any way a citizen,' and so on. That protects the man who
is seeking employment from being hindered and if there is any-
thing wrong about that I would like to have it pointed out to me."52
Burleigh Spalding of Fargo, an attorney, then moved to amend
Lauder's proposal by inserting the word "maliciously" before "inter-
fering" and deleting the reference to punishment. 3 As so amended
the proposal, notably lacking any reference to the black list, was
then carried. The foes of the black list, however, were not so readi-
ly discouraged. Three, days later they again raised the issue, pre-
sumably after an appropriate amount of lobbying, and offered a
new proposal in the form of a simple declaration: "The exchange
of black lists between corporations shall be prohibited."54 There
was a surprisingly brief flurry of additional argument - "If this is
adopted they will be able then to get up red lists and then blue
lists. Men who want to can get around these things without any
trouble" - but it was of relatively apathetic character; and both
§ 23 and § 209 of the North Dakota Constitution had thereby won
adoption.
The prohibition against black listing appears to have proved in-
nocuous and has never been judicially construed,5 though it should
be noted that black listing by a labor union constitutes an unfair
labor practice under the North Dakota Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act. 6 Section 23 of the Constitution, however, is a potential
source of uncertainty in the law. The major question arising from
its broadly generalized language - at the moment purely theoreti-
cal, since the point is unequivocally settled by statute"T - is
whether it amounts to a constitutional prohibition of the closed or
the union shop. It has been argued that requiring an enmployee to
join a labor organization as a condition of retaining his employment,
which is the basic feature of the union shop, amounts to "hindering"
him from "enjoying employment already obtained." Mr. Justice
Grimson came extremely close to employing this precise construc-
tion in Minor v. Building & Construction Trades Council as re-
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 626; this is now N.D. Const. § 209.
55. The same thing is true of N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-07i a statutory re-enactment
of the section.
56. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (2) (h).
57. N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-14.
58. 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
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cently as 1956, and the terminology of the section - it prohibits
"interfering or hindering in any way" - is certainly not inconsistent
with such a reading.
On the other hand, the merits of the closed or union shop were
- as the preceding discussion of the debate at the Convention indi-
cates - not the topics which the delegates had in mind when they
were discussing § 23. Morever, it should be noted that it is not
just hindrance or interference with employment which the section
prohibits. The action must be taken maliciously, an extremely im-
portant requirement susceptible of numerous varying construc-
tions.5 9 The Restatement of Torts, for instance, adopts the position
that so long as union membership is open to an employee on reason-
able terms his fellow employees are privileged to secure his dis-
missal for non-membership as a legitimate method of advancing
their own economic interests."0 This position has, however, not
been accepted without vigorous dissent and the issue seems reason-
ably open in terms of the case law. 61
Another factor bearing upon the question involves the problem
of whether § 23 is self-executing. It should be noted that while
violation of the section is declared by its language to be a mis-
demeanor, Spalding's amendment deleted any reference to punish-
ment and thus left the extent of the penalty to be imposed subject
to legislative determination. Some evidence that contemporary
opinion did not regard these sections as being of self-executing
character is to be found in the circumstances that both § 28 and §
209 of the Constitution - which were obviously part of the same
general proposal and initially sponsored by the same delegate -
were re-enacted as a part of the statutory law of this state shortly
after the Constitution became effective.6 2 If this is an accurate read-
ing of the history and purpose of the section, then it may be sug-
gested further that its effect was intended to vary according to the
legislative amplification it receives, i.e., that an act is malicious if it
breaches a statutory policy of the state of North Dakota regarding
freedom of employment but is not malicious within the meaning
of the Constitutional provision if in accord with the statutes. Such
an interpretation would render any reasonably relevant statute cal-
59. In the context of North Dakota criminal law, the words "malice" and "maliciously"
are defined to "import a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another person, or an intent to do
a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law." N.D. Century Code §
12-01-04 (4) (emphasis supplied). On the basis of this statute alone, at least three con-
structions of the term "maliciously" are possible.
60. Restatement, Torts § 810 (1939); Prosser, Torts 1001 et seq. (1941).
61. Eskin, The Legality of "Peaceful Coercion" in Labor Disputes, 85 U.Pa.L.Rev.
456 (1937).
62. N.D. Cept. Code §§ 34-01-06, 34-01-07.
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culated in the judgment of the Legislative Assembly to promote
employment permissible under the terms of § 23; and whether the
union shop helps or hinders this objective seems appropriately a
matter for legislative judgment.
The legislative history of § 120 of the North Dakota Constitution
also indicates a connection with labor problems, although it is be-
lieved that the final outcome was of little practical contemporary
significance. Section 120 provides:
"Tribunals of conciliation may be established with such
powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law, or the powers
and duties of such may be conferred upon other courts of jus-
tice; but such tribunals or other courts when sitting as such,
shall have no power to render judgment to be obligatory on the
parties, unless they voluntarily submit their matters of differ-
ence and agree to abide the judgment of such tribunals or
courts."
While the Debates are silent upon the origin of this provision, it
appears to have been a modified version of a section of the Michi-
gan Constitution of 1850.6" The understanding which the delegates
had of its meaning is indicated by a debate which occurred on the
thirty-sixth day of the convention when William Lauder offered a
resolution providing that "Laws shall be passed by the Legislative
Assembly providing for the amicable settlement of differences be-
tween employers and employes by arbitration."64 The following
colloquy then occurred on the floor of the Convention:
"Mr. STEVENS. I desire to know if that is not already cov-
ered in the provision which provides for boards of conciliation.
"Mr. LAUDER. No, that is not provided for. The boards
of conciliation provided for in the judicial report simply pro-
vide for the settlement of differences that may arise without
a law suit. It doesnot provide for the settlement of differences
that arise between employers and employees. This provides
for an entirely different thing and I hope it will pass."
65
After discussion of the question whether Lauder's proposal
amounted to authorizing compulsory arbitration of labor disputes
- something Lauder denied - Stevens read the text of § 120 to
the Convention and continued:
"Now, unless the conciliatory measures to be adopted as a
63. "The legislature may establish courts of conciliation with such powers and duties
as shall be prescribed by law." Mich. Const. Art. 6, § 23 (1850). Pursuant to the pro-
visions of this section, Michigan did in fact establish a tribunal known as the "state court
of mediation and arbitration" to aid in the settlement of labor disputes. The operation of
this court is interestingly described in Renaud v. State Court of Mediation and Arbitration,
124 Mich. 648, 83 N.W. 620 (1900), which suggests that the orignal inspiration for the
establishment of such tribunals came from a Norwegian statute enacted in 1824.
64. Debates, North Dakota Constitutional Convention 523 (1889).
65. Id. at 524.
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Board of Arbitration (sic) conform to this section, it would be
in conflict with this section, and if it does conform, it is covered
by this section, and these courts could settle differences be-
tween employer and employee as well as differences between
any other parties. It seems to me that the matter is fully cov-
ered by this section, and any other board to be established
would be in conflict with this section."66
Although Lauder continued to maintain that his proposal pro-
vided for "an entirely different thing," the position taken by Stevens
that § 120 allowed the State to do everything Lauder wanted to do
struck the majority of the delegates as sounder, and Lauder's pro-
posal was ultimately tabled.6 Since § 120 is permissible in char-
acter and merely grants permission to the State to do something
which it would be authorized to do anyway in the absence of a
constitutional provision, it has been of little practical significance
since its adoption.
As noted previously, the Convention also took up the problem
of child labor. The initial proposal was to prohibit the labor of
children under 15 in "mines, factories, and work shops,"6" this last
stipulation being obviously designed to permit the employment of
minors in occupations of other types, e.g., agriculture. But on the
floor of the convention the proposal encountered difficulties and
in the end emerged with the age limit lowered to 12 years. That
this was a meaningless and inconclusive outcome is apiarent from
the fact that the first session of the Legislative Assembly, meeting
within three months of the adjournment of the Constitutional Con-
vention, raised the limit to 14 years and broadened the proscription
against child labor to include mercantile establishments, though
making the statute effective only during school hours. 9 Since that
time, the significant laws reating to child labor have been found on
the statute books rather than in the Constitution. If it does any-
thing, the child labor amendment does little more than demonstrate
graphically the point that it is unrealistic to attempt to regulate
the relationship between employers and employees by fixed Con-
stitutional provisions and that such matters are far better handled
by statute.
V. THE STATUTORY PATTERN
It has been remarked that the law of labor must be viewed as
the outgrowth of an evolutionary process - the transformation of
an agrarian society into an industrial one - which began with the
66. Ibid.
67. Id. at 526.
68. Id. at 506.
69. N.D. Laws 1890, c. 62, § 143.
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Industrial Revolution and is still going on.70  Considered in this
light the development of North Dakota's labor statutes furnishes an
interesting subject of investigation.
The earliest statutes relating to the employer-employee relation-
ship in this jurisdiction were originally derived from the California
version of the Field Code. Appearing in the 1887 edition of the
Dakota Civil Code under the title "Service,"' they were of a rather
basic character 2 and represented little more than a logical ampli-
fication of fundamental principles of the law of contracts as dir-
ected toward the master-servant relationship. While the care with
which they were drafted was noteworthy, it is fairly plain that the
essence of these early enactments - which currently constitute
the bulk of chapters 34-01 through 34-04 of the Century Code -
lay in an implicit recognition of laissez-faire principles of economics
as expressed in law. The statutes contemplated a bargain between
an individual employer and an individual employee, and it was
sufficient for their purpose if the hirer and the hired, whatever
their actual disparity in economic bargaining power, had come to
an agreement the law could regard as voluntary. The idea that
society had an interest (or, at least, very much of an interest) in
the terms and conditions of the bargain nowhere appears in the
early statutes;73 and equally notable by its absence was the con-
cept that bargaining between employers and employees could in-
volve groups, i.e., that there could be a process of collective
bargaining.
74
This was a situation which, in thelight of contemporary economic
development, could not be expected to endure indefinitely. Indeed,
the growing acceptance of the point that the public has a legitimate
concern with the consequences of contracts of employment, and the
steady shift in emphasis to the more realistic modern view that most
significant employment relationships are the result of a collective
70. Plock, Methods Adopted by States for Settlement of Labor Disputes Without Orig-
inal Recourse to Courts, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 430 (1949).
71. Dak. Civ. Code §§ 1128-1207 (1887).
72. It is interesting to note that these early enactments dealt with the topic of ship-
masters, mates, seamen and ships' managers more extensively than-with any other subject,
undoubtedly in deference to the prevalence of water transportation along the Missouri.
Dak. Civ. Code §§ 1173-1205 (1877).
73. The closest they came to imposing any serious restrictions on the freedom of the
parties to set any terms they wished was to provide that the tine of a servant belonged to
the master only to the extent of ten hours per day; and even this provision was qualified by
an exception in the case of domestic servants, whose entire time was stipulated to belong
to the employer. Dak. Civ. Code § 1161. As to who is a master and who a servant, see
Restatement, Agency § 220, Comment a (1933).
74. At one time, of course, any combination between working men to improve their
wages or conditions of work was punishable as a conspiracy; but this ancient rule of the
common law has never prevailed in this state.
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bargaining process appear to furnish the two main channels of the
law's development.
But for all of that, it was a slow process. Additional regulation
of child labor did not come until 1909.7 1 It was not until 1919 that
statutes prescribing the maximum hours of work and rates of pay
for women and children were adopted in North Dakota,"' or that
workmen's compensation was introduced.
77
It was not until as recently as 1935 that the first of the genuinely
contemporary statutes found its way onto the books. In that year
the North Dakota Legislative Assembly, moved by considerations
ably set forth in a preceding issue of the North Dakota Law Re-
view,
7 ' enacted a substantially verbatim version of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act and thereby attempted to curb the use of the injunc-
tion as a weapon in labor disputes. 7  The anti-injunction act was,
for the time being, a high water mark in the field and was followed
by a period of relative quiescence.
With the conclusion of World War II, however, it became appar-
ent that legislative attention was focusing on problems of labor
relations more strongly than ever. In common with a good many
other western and southern states,50 North Dakota enacted in 1947
legislation broadly regulating union activities." Vigorously opposed
5. N.D. Laws 1909, c. 153. Since that time the statutes have gradually evolved to
their present form by a process of successive amendment. Testimony before the Special
Committee to Study Labor Laws indicates that the child labor provisions now on the
statute books are often disregarded and that the procedures for issuance of an employment
certificate are excessively cumbersome. The Special Committee accordingly recommended
simplification of the current statutes, but the draft legislation was tied to the unsuccessful
statute creating a separate deparment of labor and the failure of the later statute ended
the prospect of success. The relationship between state and federal law in this area should
he noted. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 provides generally that the labor of
children under 16 shall not be used in establishments producing goods for shipment in
interstate or foreign commerce. 52 Stat. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1958). But
this does not apply to agricultural employment outside of school hours. 52 Stat. 1067
(1938), 29 U.S.C. § 213 (c) (1958). There are, in addition, further regulations pre-
scribed in the case of sugar beet workers. 70 Stat. 220 (1956), 7 U.S.C. § 1131 (a).
Senator McNamara of Michigan has declared that "In 1957, the last year for which com-
plete figures are available, more than 227,000 children between the ages of 10 and 13
were classified as paid farm-workers. One-third of these children put in a workweek of
35 hours or more. We have no accurate figures on how many workers were younger than
10; but there is evidence that the number is large. There is also evidence to indicate that
a large number of youngsters between 14 and 16 are full-time paid workers during a good
part of the year." Cong. Ree., June 9, 1959, 9230. There are national figures and no
figures have been located indicating the number of children employed in agricultural labor
in North Dakota.
76. N.D. Laws 1919 c. 174.
77. N.D. Laws 1919, c. 162.
78. Kerian, Injunctions in Labor Disputes: The History of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
37 N.D. L. Rev. 49 (1961).
79. N.D. Cent. Code c. 34-08.
80. "In a considerable number of predominantly agricultural states in the West and
South, in which the growth of industry and of labor unions has been greatly stimulated
by war conditions, the rising tide of anti-union sentiment has brought about the enactment
of labor legislation which is predominantly anti-union in character." Dodd, Some State
Legislatures Go to War - on Labor Unions, 29 Iowa L. Rev. 148, 150 (1943).
81. N.D. Laws 1947, c. 242.
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by the state's labor organizations, the measure was referred to a
vote of the people at the 1948 election but passed quite handily.
The effect of this legislation was to impose extensive reporting re-
quirements upon labor organizations,' 2  to place restrictions on
picketing,83 and to prohibit entirely the use of boycotting, second-
ary boycotting, and sympathy strikes as weapons in labor disputes.81
The state also elected, at this time, to join the ranks of those juris-
dictions possessing "right-to-work" laws, 85 and thus banned both.the
closed and union shop.sr
However, the influence of contemporary developments in other
fields of labor law also made itself felt. In 1951 there was intro-
duced into the Legislative Assembly a measure embodying the sub-
stance of the Minnesota labor relations act, but the proposal failed
to gain approval. This was followed two years later by a bill es-
tablishing a labor dispute board with limited powers, its function
being primarily that of conciliation, which was enacted. The 1953
session also repealed the reporting requirements imposed on unions
82. N.D. Laws 1947, c. 242, §§ 2-5.
83. As it currently appears on the statute books, having been amended in 1953, the
secton provides that "In any strike in this state it shall be illegal for any person other than
an employee of the particular establishment against which such strike is called or a local
resident member of the union representing the employees of such establishment to picket
in aid of such strike. Picketing in violation of this section is hereby declared to be un-
lawful and against the peace and dignity of the state and shall be subject to restraint by
the district court of the county where such picketing occurs." N.D. Cent. Code § 34-09-12.
In AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 324-26 (1941), Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared: "We
are asked to sustain a decree which asserts as the common law of a state that there can
be no 'peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any dispute between an
employer and a trade union unless the employer's own employees are in controversy with
him. Such a ban on free communication is inconsistent with the guarantee of freedom of
speech . . . A state cannot exclude workingmen from peacefully exercising the right of
free communication by drawing the circle of economic competition between employers and
workers so small as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by him." See
also Shiland v. Retail Clerks, 259 Ala. 277, 66 So.2d 146 (1953).
84. "Boycotting, secondary boycotting and sympathy strikes are hereby declared to be
against the public policy and against the peace and dignity of the state of North Dakota
and shall be subject to restraint by the district courts of the state of North Dakota as well
as suits for damages therein." N.D. Cent. Code § 34-09-13. Compare Ex Parte Blaney,
,30 Cal.2d 643, 184 P.2d 892 (1947); Simons Brick Co. v. United Brick, Tile & Clay
Workers, 32 Cal.2d 156, 194 P.2d 696 (1948); Weston v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.2d
866, 189 P.2d 9 (1948; Butte v. Distillery Workers Int. Union, 31 Cal.2d 687, 189 P.2d
9 (1948), with Hotel & R.E.I. Alliance v. Wisconsin Employmeot Relations Board, 236
Wis. 239, 294 N.W. 632, 295 N.W. 634 (1941).
85. There are 19 such states. See Ala. Code, Tit. 26, § 375(1)-(7) (1940); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. §§ 23-1301 - 23-1307 (1955); Ark. Const. Amend. 34; Fla. Const. § 12; Ga. Laws
1947, c. 140; Ind. Laws 1957, c. 190; Iowa Code §§ 736A.1 - 736A.8 (1958); Kan.
Const., Art. 15 § 12; Miss. Code §§ 6984.5 -- 6995.5 (1942); Neb. Const., Art. 15 §§
13-15; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 613.230, 613.300; N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-14; S.C. Laws
1954, S.B. 443 §§ 1-2; S.D. Code §§ 17.1101 - 17.9914 (Supp. 1952); Tenn. Code
§ 11412.8 (1932); Tex. Laws 1955, c. 45 §§ 1-6; Utah Laws 1955, c. 85; Va. Code
§ 40-7402. Louisiana has repealed its general right-to-work law but has kept it for agri-
cultural labor. La. Laws 1956, c. 16 and 397. New Hampshire repealed its statute in
1949. N.H. Laws 1949, c. 57.
86. Minor v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 75 N.W.2d 139 (N.D. 1956).
87. N.D. Cent. Code c. 34-10.
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in 1947, apparently on the ground their validity was questionable.s"
The labor dispute board established in 1953 was the first North
Dakota agency specifically charged with responsibility for over-
seeing the conduct of labor disputes. However, its record was not
impressive" and the restricted character of its authority was so
apparent that it failed to halt further proposals for amplification
of the state's labor statutes. In 1957 the proposal to adopt legisla-
tion following the Minnesota model was once again put forward,
though once more without success. After being extensively amended
the measure was not passed.
This served as a prelude to the 1959 session, which witnessed a
notable effort to enact a comprehensive labor relations statute. The
measure in question, denominated the "North Dakota Labor Peace
Act,"0 was patterned after statutes found in Wisconsin, Utah, and
Colorado. Carefully drafted on the basis of extensive research, the
chances for its enactment appeared promising. However, the mea-
sure was a lengthy one, was presented late in the legislative session,
and contained an appropriation. As a result it ran afoul of a par-
liamentary rule requiring a two-thirds majority for enactment,
which it had no prospect of obtaining. This incident undoubtedly
had a bearing on the legislation enacted in 1961, since the defeat
of the bill was promptly followed by passage of a resolution author-
izing the appointment of a special committee to study the subject
of labor legislation." The ultimate outcome was that the Special
Committee to Study Labor Laws recommended the current mea-
sure. It is thus apparent that while the North Dakota Labor-Man-
agement Relations Act breaks new substantive ground it has a
substantial legislative history behind it, and fits quite readily into
the general evolutionary pattern previously mentioned.
88. But see AFL v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810, app. dismissed 325 U.S. 450
(1945), upholding such requirements. It should be noted that N.D. Labor-Management
Relations Act § 12 designates the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor as the official
to receive copies of all reports made by labor organizations to the Secretary of Labor of
the United States.
89. Labor representatives before the Special Committee to Study Labor Laws took the
position it had failed to resolve any labor disputes whatever. It should be noted that the
board's personnel changed from dispute to dispute, thus depriving the board of continuity,
and that it lacked power to do more than make public recommendations and findings.
90. H.B. 859, N.D. Legislative Assembly (1959).
91. N.D. Laws 1959, House Concurrent Resolution G-2. The resolution provided that:
"Whereas, it is the desire of the Legislative Assembly to examine the labor laws of the
state of North Dakota; and whereas, it is extremely difficult during a hurried sixty-day
session to properly study and examine this field and to prepare comprehensive legislation
upon this subject; Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the
State of North Dakota, the Senate concurring therein: That the governor is hereby author-
ized'to appoint a special committee consisting of members of the legislative assembly, the
general public, and such other persons as the governor may determine to study and examine
the labor laws of the state of North Dakota during the 1959-61 biennium and to make its
report and recommendations to the governor and to the thirty-seventh legislative assembly."
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VI.
THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
It is probable that in no other area of labor law do the states vary
so widely as in respect to their legislation regarding the right of
employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining.
These provisions are usually the crux of state labor legislation and
normally determine the practical effectiveness or ineffectiveness of
the various state enactments.
Since the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act basic-
ally follows the federal pattern in this regard, some understanding
of the point of view embodied in the National Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 is desirable. The federal statute is premised
on the view that from the standpoint of employees the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively is essentially the equivalent of the
right possessed by employers to associate together in corporations,
partnerships, and associations, and is entitled to protection for
much the same reasons.92 That employees need the right of self-
organization and that it is socially desirable is widely recognized.
Thirty-eight states out of 50 have declared in favor of freedom of
organization either as a matter of policy or of explicit law, and no
state affirmatively forbids its exercise. 9  The most widely-copied
enactment in the field is § 7 of the National Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947,9 4 which provides that:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage
in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all such activities, except to the
extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requir-
ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
plo'yment as authorized by § 8 (a) (3) of this Act."
92. Thus, one justification cited for the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
that "under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of governmental authori-
ty for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other forms of ownership as-
sociation, the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty
of contract and to protect his freedom of labor . .. " 47 Stat. 70 (19,32), 29,U.S.C. §
102 (1958). And the Taft-Hartley Act itself declared that "The. inequality of bargaining
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership
association . . . tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing-the stabilization
of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries." 61
Stat. 136, (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958). See NLRB v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 133
F.2d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 1943).
93. See footnotes 100-102, infra.
94. 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
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This provision has been described as "the heart of the National
Labor Relations Act."
',!
Although the North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act
does not adopt this language verbatim (this is a consequence of the
fact the federal statute leaves the status of the closed and union
shops optional with the states whereas North Dakota prohibits
them) the resemblance between the two statutes is extremely
close. Section 2 of the North Dakota statute provides that:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form
join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities and shall
be free to decline to associate with their fellows and shall be
free to obtain employment wherever possible without interfer-
ence or being hindered in any way."
Interference with rights conferred by § 2 is explicitly made an
unfair labor practice by a succeeding section of the North Dakota
act.96
Recognition of the right of self-organization is, of course, not
unknown in prior North Dakota statutesf7 However, the earlier
laws have simply provided that it is the policy of the state to per-
mit organization for the purpose of collective bargaining, without
attempting to provide mechanisms whereby the policy could be
made enforceable. This is the fundamental difference.
As a practical matter the administration of statutes of the fore-
going type often presents the advocate with difficult evidentiary
problems, since interference with the right of employee self-organi-
zation can take many forms. A study made in 1942 listed as illu-
strative examples of attempts to evade the statute cases in which
employees (a) are discharged outright because of membership in,
or activity on behalf of, a labor organization opposed by the em-
ployer; (b) are locked out discriminatorily following a strike be-
cause of union activity; (c) are rehired after a lockout only to be
discharged for apparent good cause; (d) are laid off on false
grounds of inefficiency; (e) are laid off ostensibly because of a
reduction in force, shutdown of a department, work shortage, etc.,
95. Youngdahl, Federal Limitations on State Jurisdiction Over Labor-Management Re-
lotions, 12 Ark. L. Rev. 354, 368 (1958).
96. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (1) (a).
97. See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 34-08-02, 34-09-01. Even § 34-01-14, N.D. Cent. Code,
provides that "the right of persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership . . . in any labor union . . ."
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when in fact discrimination because of unionism is involved, as
shown by less competent or less experienced persons being retained
or transferred or rehired; (f) are rehired after a strike but harassed
until the employment becomes unbearable and the affected em-
ployee is forced to quit; (g) are discharged because of keeping
union literature in a locker or wearing union buttons; (h) are
transferred to less remunerative employment, or to work entailing
other disadvantages, because of the employer's opposition to a
union; or (i) are refused employment because the applicant is a
union member or has been active in union matters."
Under current federal law each of the foregoing actions would
be subject to restraint as an unfair labor practice on the ground
they interfered with the right of self-organization by "discrimina-
tion in regard to hire or tenure of employment ...to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." 90 The same
result is contemplated under the current North Dakota enactment.
This is an advanced position on a matter concerning which the
states, as previously noted, have enacted widely varying provisions.
Since this is a key area of contemporary labor law the various
state enactments are by no means uniform, and it is sometimes not
easy to classify a state or determine the category into which it falls.
The American states, however, appear to fall roughly into four gen-
eral classifications:
1. States in which the right of self-organization is protected by
a labor relations act. While the terms of the enactments vary, this
listing includes Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin, as well as Puerto Rico.100
2. States in which the right of self-organization is legally pro-
tected but not administratively implemented. In this category fall
California, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada,
and North Carolina.''
3. States in which the right of self-organization is merely favored
as a matter of public policy. This group includes Alabama, Ark-
98. Bownan, Public Control of Labor Relations 77-78 (1942).
99. 65 Stat. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3).
100. See Colo. Rev. Stat. c. 80-5 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31,105 et seq. (1958);
Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 150a; Mich. Comp. Laws, c. 423 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. §
179.08 et seq. (1957); N.Y. Consol. Laws § 700-716; Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit.
43, §§ 211.1 - 211.13; R.I. Laws 1941, c. 1066; Utah Code § 34-1-1 et seq.
(1953); Wis. Stat. §§ 111.1-111.9 (1957).
101. Cal. Labor Code §§ 920-923; Fla. Stat. §§ 447.03, 447.09 (1959); Kan.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 44-803 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 336.130 (1956); La. Rev. Stat.
§§ 23.8222, 23.824 (1950); Me. Rev.' Stat. c. 30, § 15. (Supp. 1959); Nev. Rev.
Stat. §§ 614.090 (1), 604.111; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-83.
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kansas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, Nebras-
ka, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
10 2
4. States in which the right of self-organization is not declared
by statute. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia,
Mississippi, Montana, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
VII. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Employers
Most of the practices which the North Dakota Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act defines as unfair when engaged in by an em-
ployer center about the rights conferred upon employees by § 2
of the Act. Thus the broad principle underlying many of the pro-
visions of § 3 (1) of the Act, which defines unfair labor practices
on the part of employers, is one of securing to employees effective
freedom of choice in making the decision whether to join a labor
organization by insulating them as far as reasonably possible from
legal or economic pressure or coercion on the part of employers.1""
For this reason, § 3 (1) (a) of the Act stipulates generally that it
is an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of their rights under
§ 2. Similarly, § 3 (1) (c) provides that it is unfair for an employer
to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization
by "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment".
While the language of § 3 (1) is closely copied from the com-
parable provisions of the National Labor-Management Relations
Act of 1947, at least one significant amendment found its way into
the statute during the course of its preparation. Section 3 (1) (b)
of the North Dakota Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "dominate or interfere with the formation or admini-
stration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it." This was a provision fundamentally intended in the
102. Ala. Code, Tit. 26, § 383 (1940); Ark. Stat. § 41-4124 (1947); Idaho
Code § 44-701 (1947); Ill. Rev. Stat., c. 48, § 2b (1957); Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. §
40-502 (1933); Iowa Code § 553.11 (1958); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 100, § 63
(1951); Mo. Const. Art. 1, § 29 Neb. Laws 1959, c. 231, § 4; N.H. Rev. Stat., c.
589, § 11 (1955); N.J. Const., Art. 1, § 19; N.M. Laws 1959, c. 26, § 1; Okla.
Stat., Tit. 21, c. 52, § 126.11 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 662.040; Tex. Rev. Civ.
Stat. § 5152 (1948); Wash. Rev. Stat. § 49.32.020; Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 54-501
(1945).
103. "The trend of the statutes is toward a point at which domination of an individual, a
group, a union, or a business, by use of force, bribery, coercion, or other phyisical or
economic means, will no longer be tolerated. American ideals of freedom and fair play
are effective in declarations that such domination is out of bounds." Plock, supra note
70, at 478.
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federal enactment to furnish protection against the so-called "com-
pany union." '  However, the North Dakota statute adds to the
language of § 3 (1) (b) the further proviso that its language is not
to be construed to "prohibit an employer from conferring with em-
ployees or their bona fide representatives and including, but not
by way of limitation, explaining the position of management in
connection with the internal problems of the employer during work-
ing hours without the loss of pay."
This amendment raises a thoroughly sensitive issue. At the root
of the problem is the thorny question of when the exercise of the
right of free speech passes the dividing line between advocacy and
interference. It is, of course, perfectly ligitimate for an employer
to freely express and advocate opposition to employee organiza-
tion. 105 He may do so, as the preceednts make plain, in thoroughly
vigorous fashion."" Both the Federal and North Dakota statutes
contain a provision dealing with this precise matter:
"The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such
expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of
benefit.."'
1 7
Adjudications under the Federal Act, however, have drawn a
sharp distinction between argument on one hand and coercion on
the other.," It has been recognized that the economic power over
employees normally possessed by employers often makes state-
ments on the part of employers far more significant in terms of
their effect upon employee conduct than similar statements would
be if made by a third party.1°9
In connection with this problem the NLRB has evolved what is
known as the "captive audience" doctrine. With an election to de-
termine the statute of his plant as union or non-union impending,
an employer is privileged to assemble his workers for a pre-election
campaign speech on company time and on the company premises.110
104. See Dixie Bedding Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 268 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1959).
105. NLRB v. Armco Drainage & Metal Products, Inc., 220 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (195).
106. Thus, "appeals to reason," as well as characterization of unions as "outlaw,"
"wildcat," and "off-breed," or admonitions to "stay out of trouble" have been held
priviledged. CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 603.
107. 65 Stat. 601, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (c) (1958); N.D. Labor-Management Relations
Act § 8 (3).
108. NLRB v. Salant & Salant, Inc., 183 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Sidran,
181 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1950).
109. CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 603.
110. Livingston Shirt Corporation, 107 NLRB 400 (1953); NLRB v. Ameican Tube
Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1953).
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However, he must give the union an opportunity to reply if union
solicitation on his premises, during the employees' free time, is not
permitted."' On the other hand, if the employer permits such union
solicitation, no opportunity to reply to statements made by the em-
ployer at a meeting of his employees called to discuss the question
of unionization need be afforded. 1 12 Coupled with these decisions
has been the so-called "24-hour rule". The NLRB has ruled that
neither employer nor union may make speeches to massed assem-
blies of employees within 24 hours of a plant election, though this
proscription does not apply where attendance at a meeting is vol-
untary and is held off company premises on the employees' own
time.113 The employee thus has at least 24 hours to consider his
decision and cast a calm and reflective vote, a not-inconsiderable
privilege in an era marked by the prevalence of high-powered pro-
paganda. How far the amendment to § 3 (1) (b) affects these
interpretations given to the federal act is uncertain. It is, of course,
apparent that the amendment does not authorize the use of coercion,
since the statute retains the rule that the expression of views is not
privileged if such expression contains threats or reprisal, force, or
the promise of benefit. On the other hand, the dividing line be-
tween a conference and a meeting is as best a metaphysical one,
and no time limit is set in the statute for the holding of such a
conference. While it is believed the amendment can not be inter-
preted in such a manner as to infringe the right of employees to
make a free and unfettered choice, it is nevertheless apparent that
enforcement of the captive audience doctrine and the 24-hour rule
in this jurisdiction will present some extremely close and difficult
question.
Section 3 (1) (d) of the North Dakota Act makes it an unfair
practice to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act, and
§ 3 (1) (e) makes it an unfair practice to refuse to bargain col-
lectively with employee representatives. These are identical to
federal provisions on the same subject.
B. Labor Organizations
As initially drafted the North Dakota Labor-Management Re-
lations Act adhered closely to the federal provisions regarding un-
111. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 19 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952); but see Livingston
Shirt Corporation, 107 NLRB 400 (1953). As to the general duty to permit solicitation,
see Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
112. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952).
113. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427 (1953).
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fair labor practices on the part of both employers and labor organi-
zations. However, during the course of committee discussion the
section of the Act relating to unfair labor practices by labor or--
ganizations underwent some expansion. As ultimately passed the:
Act therefore defines as an unfair practice some types of uniort
conduct not so listed in the Federal Act.
In keeping with the fundamental philosophy that the choice of
a bargaining representative by employees is a matter in which the
employees are entitled to freedom from outside interference, the
Act surrounds the rights given to employees by § 2 with protection
from the effects of union as employer activities. Thus it is an unfair
labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce employees in the ex-
ercise of their freedom to organize and bargain collectively, either
directly"l4 or - as sometimes happens - by causing an employer
to do so. 145 While this broad principle of freedom from restraint
or coercion is applicable to a wide variety of situations, its primary
thrust in the case of labor organizations is normally directed against
violence or the threat of violence in connection with representation
elections and labor disputes."'5 It thus serves as a device for keep-
ing union activities peaceful in character.
In drafting the North Dakota Act, some difficulty was en-
countered in adapting the so-called "hot cargo" and "secondary
boycott" provisions of the Federal Act to local purposes. As a
reading of these portions of the National Labor-Management Re-
lations Act will make clear, the sections in question are of a lengthy
and complex character and by no means represent a triumph of
federal legislative draftsmanship."'r A North Dakota statute" 8
enacted in 1947 already prohibited the practice of secondary boy-
114. "'It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . , to
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 2 of this Act
N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (2) (a).
115. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
to cause or attempt to case an employer to discriminate or restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of the rights set forth in § 2 of this Act." N.D. Labor-Management Re-
lations Act § 3 (2) (b).
116. The fundamental intention of the Act is to place employers and labor organiza-
tioins under an identical disability to interfere with the freedom of employees to choose
their bargaining representatives. However, as a moment's consideration will indicate, there
is an intrinsic difference in the position of the employer and the labor organzation with
respect to the employee. Hence certain forms of conduct which are illegal in the case of
the employer are permissible in the case of the labor organization, and vice versa. The use
of force or violence is, of course, the clearest example of a union violation of the free-
dom of employees to make their own choice of a bargaining representative. See Progressive
Mineworkers v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1951). Equally, however, as in the case
of employers, the North Dakota Act will be susceptible of use against more subtle forms
of coercion. Note the statement made in Aaron and Levin, The Labor Injunction in Action,
39 Calif. L. Rev. 42, 64 (1951): "All unions know, and some will admit, that a degree
of intimidation is often a vital ingredient in a successful organizational drive."
117. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158 (b) (4).
118. N.D. Cent .Code § 34-09-13.
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cotting in this state, and one potential solution to the difficulty
would have been to omit any reference to the matter from the
Labor-Management Relations Act altogether, thus leaving it to be
regulated exclusively by the earlier enactment. However, the 1947
enactment failed to define the term "secondary boycott," and case
law from other jurisdictions indicates that enforcement of the stat-
ute may thus encounter constitutional difficulties arising from un-
certainty as to the precise meaning of the term.119 In consequence
the North Dakota act was ultimately framed to include a simplified
version of the Federal statute, intended to include the basic policy
of the Federal law without necessarily incorporating all its technical
ramifications. Even as thus reframed, the statute is complex enough.
It provides, in § 3 (2) (e), that it is an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents:
"To engage in, or to induce or encourage any employee to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment
to use or work on any goods, articles, materials or commodities,
or to perform any services, or to threaten, coerce or restrain
any person for the purpose of forcing or requiring any person
to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise
dealing in the products of any other producer, processor ,or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person,
or forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees
unless such labor organization as the representative of his em-
ployees unless such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of his employees under the provisions of section
5 of this Act; but nothing in this subsection shall be construed
to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing, and nothing contained in this sub-
section shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any
person to enter upon the premises of any employer, other than
his own employer, if the employees of such other employer are
engaged in a lawful strike."
A study of the federal statute has pointed out that the compar-
able provision of the National Labor-Management Relations Act
of 1947 condemns three things: (1) an actual work stoppage or
refusal to work; (2) inducing or encouraging of a work stoppage
or refusal to work; (3) threats, coercion, or restraint of any person
engaged in a business covered by the Federal Act, where an object
of such action is forcing or requiring any person to cease dealing
or doing business with any other person. -1 2 ' For this reason the
Federal Act has been said not to amount to a general prohibition
119. See footnote 84, supra.
120. CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 1105.
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of secondary boycotting, but only to a prohibition of it where car-
ried on for purposes inconsistent with the National Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act.1 21
Since a literal reading of this section would outlaw picketing,12
2
the Federal Act specifically includes language intended to negative
such a reading. This feature of the statute is also included in the
North Dakota Act, since a reading of the section under discussion
will indicate that the refusal of an employee to cross a picket line
surrounding another employer's place of business is permissible un-
der its terms. Refusal to cross a picket line is, in any event, a deep-
rooted tradition of the trade union movement and a statute which
attempted to deny the custom would undoubtedly prove difficult
to enforce.
The North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act also pro-
vides, in common with the National Labor-Managament Relations
Act, that it is an unfair labor practice
"To require of employees as a condition for (union) member-
ship the payment of fees found by the commissioner to be ex-
cessive or discriminatory.
' 123
This is one of the few provisions regulating the internal affairs
of labor organizations found in the statute. It should be noted that
§ 3 (2) (a) specifically provides that "a labor organization may
prescribe its own rules for the acquisition and maintenance of mem-
bership in said labor organization." In this connection, however,
it should be noted that the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 contains extensive provisions designed to
regulate the rights of union members with respect to their organi-
zations.12
Most of the remaining subsections dealing-with unfair labor prac-
tices on the part of labor organizations go somewhat beyond the
provisions of the National Labor-Management Relations Act. In
common with the federal statute, the North Dakota Act prohibits
as an unfair labor practice causing or attempting to cause an em-
ployer to pay an exaction for services which are not performed or
not to be performed.ll2 But in addition the North Dakota Act pro-
vides that it is an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
"h. To make, circulate, or cause to be circulated, a blacklist;
"i. To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of
121. Carpenters' Union v. Labor Board, 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
122. CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 1105.
123. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (2) (f).
124. See Orban, The 1959 Labor Law: Rights and Remedies of the Union Member,
37 N.D. L. Rev. 37 (1961).
125. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (2) (g).
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his legal rights, or to intimidate his family or any member
thereof, picket his domicile, or injure the person or property of
such employee or his family or any member thereof;
"j. To hinder or prevent by unlawful picketing, threats, in-
midation, force or coercion of any kind, the pursuit of any law-
ful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free
and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, rail-
ways, airports or other ways of travel or conveyance." 2"
Originally proposed by management representatives on the Spec-
ial Committee to Study Labor Laws, the foregoing amendments
were quite readily accepted by labor representatives during com-
mittee deliberations. Subsection (h) merely duplicates a restriction
already placed on management in this state.12 7 Subsection (i) is
in many respects an implicit duplication of § 3 (2) (a) and in
effect defines in specific language types of conduct which would be
subject to restraint under § 3 (2) (a) in any event. Subsection (j),
however, initially drew some adverse labor reaction because it
referred to picketing generally, rather than illegal picketing. The
result was that it was finally amended to make clear that no new
substantive restrictions on the right to picket were contemplated by
the section, through inserting the word 'unlawful" before the word
"picketing".
128
VIII. THE DUTY To BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY
Since the new Act makes it an unfair labor practice for either
an employer or a labor organization to refuse to bargain collective-
ly, the provisions of the Act with regard to this subject deserve
attention. Section 4 provides:
"1. For the purposes of this Act, to bargain collectively
means the performance of the mutual obligations of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment,
or the negotiation or renegotiation of an agreement, or any
question thereunder, and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree
to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
"2. Where there is in effect a collective bargaining con-
tract, the duty to bargain also shall mean that no party to
such contract shall terminate or modify such contract at the
conclusion of its term until sixty days after either of them mails
notice of a desire to terminate or to modify. A strike or lockout
,126. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 3 (2) (h) (i) (j).
127. See discussion of North Dakota Const. § 209, text to footnote 54, supra.
128. See footnote 83, supra.
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for economic purposes shall be unlawful until the end of the
sixty-day period. The duty to bargain collectively shall con-
tinue despite termination of a collective bargaining contract
unless the employee bargaining representative has lost its
majority status."
Although this statutory lauguage may at first glance appear for-
midable, it is believed that consideration of its operation and effect
will lead most observers to conclude that in practice it constitutes
one of the most practical and beneficial portions of the new statute.
The section could be called a "let's-talk-it-over" provision. What
it means, in down-to-earth terms, is that when a labor dispute
arises, and assuming that the question of representation has been
settled, both labor and management have an obligation to sit down
across the bargaining table and make a reasonable effort to come
to an agreement. 1 2 As its language makes plain, the statute does not
compel either side to agree to an unacceptable proposal. Similarly
it does not require indefinite negotiation.1 3 ° The requirement is
merely that the possibility of reaching an acceptable agreement
be seriously explored.
This is little more than what a reasonable businessman or labor
representative would do in any event. However, no such duty to
participate in the collective bargaining process has been imposed
by prior North Dakota legislation, and although the requirement is
a very mild one its omission in the past has occasionally produced
unfortunate consequences. There have been instances in which
labor disputes have continued for several years without serious at-
tempts at negotiation between the parties. It may be pointed out
additionally that in some cases, particularly where feelings are
running high, § 4 will be of practical advantage to the attorney
attempting to work out a solution of a labor dispute through com-
promise, since as a practical matter there are occasions when it is
far more difficult to induce the parties to sit down together than
it is to bring them to agreement when once they have done so.
The requirement of § 4 is that collective bargaining must be
conducted in good faith. While the term "good faith" describes a
state of mind, its presence or absence is by no means impossible
129. The NLRB has defined the scope of the duty to bargain collectively in some
detail. "The employer's duty to bargain includes the obligation to seek in good faith to
reach an understanding on wages, hours, or other conditions of employment. Negotiation
of individual grievances alone is not enough." NLRB Annual Report 49 (1942); CCH
Lab. L. Guide 2341; CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 1203.
130. "If after a genuine attempt to reach agreement, an impasse has been reached, the.
employer is not required to continue futile negotiations. Should the situation change, how-
ever, the employer must on request resume collective bargaining." NLRB Annual Report
49 (1942), cited in CCH Lab. L. Guide 2341.
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of determination. The term has been construed to mean that a
negotiator must bargain with an open mind and a sincere purpose
to reach agreement if it is possible to do so.1 Whether this pur-
pose is present can usually be determined by the objective acts and
conduct of the parties, since these acts and conduct usually furnish
concrete evidence on the point. 32 As might be expected, the extent
of negotiation required by the good-faith provision is fundamentally
determined by the facts of each case.1
33
Section 4 (2) amplifies the collective bargaining requirement by
providing that where a collective bargaining agreement is already
in existence, 60 days' notice must be given of a desire to terminate
or modify it. This requirement is applicable even where the con-
tract specifies a termination date, i.e., the notice should be given
60 days prior to the termination date specified in the contract.
IX. REPRESENTATION, ELECTIONS, BARGAINING UNITS
The provisions of the North Dakota Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act regarding the election of a union to act as a bargaining
representative for employees were the subject of warm discussion
at the committee sessions which framed these portions of the stat-
ute. These sections actually deal with a number of closely related
problems.
Since the duty to bargain collectively extends only to employees
in "appropriate" bargaining units, determination of that unit is of
obvious importance. This is dealt with in § 6 of the Act, which
allows the administering official to determine whether "the unit
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." On
this subject there is available a considerable backlog of NLRB de-
cisions.1 3 4  However, it is believed that few of the problems en-
countered in the administration of the federal statute will be dup-
licated in North Dakota, for the basic reason that any business
enterprise of sufficient size to produce a difficult question in this
131. A good discussion of the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act provision is
found in NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401-04 (1952).
132. "The problem is essentially to determine from the record the intention or the state
of mind of respondents in the matter of their negotiations with the Union. In this proceed-
ing, as in many others, such a determination is a question of fact to be determined from
the whole record. Evidence was offered and received as to the details of the negotiations,
a portion of which covered a period of time prior to six months before the charge was
filed. This evidence was principally admissable as a history and as a background for the
evaluation of evidence of events and occurrences within such six months' period." NLRB
v. National Shoes, 208 F.2d 688, 691-92 (2d Cir. 1953).
133. CCH 1960 Guidebook to Labor Relations § 1204.1.
134. See Daykin, Determination ot Appropriate Bargaining Unit by the NLRB: Princi-
ples, Rules, and Policies, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 218 (1958).
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regard will also be large enough in most cases to fall under NLRB
jurisdiction. Indeed, one experienced North Dakota attorney com-
menting on this provision of the statute during committee delibera-
tions observed that in most cases determination of the appropriate
bargaining unit will amount to little more than checking the pay-
roll. If problems of greater complexity are encountered, of course,
the statute is sufficiently flexible to allow the commissioner to meet
them.
The procedure which a union must follow in gaining status as a
bargaining representative under the Act are set forth in § 7. This
section deals fundamentally with the topic of elections. It provides
that an election may be called either upon the petition of 30 per
cent of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit or upon
the petition of the employer. In the case of a petition filed by
employees the petition must assert that their "employer declines
to recognize their representative . . . or . . . that the individual of
labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently
recognized by their employer as the bargaining representative, is
no longer a representative . "..."131 The employer is authorized to
request an election when "one or more individuals or labor organi-
zations have presented to him a claim to be recognized" as the
bargaining representative of his employees.
1
31
While most of § 7 deals with elections for the purpose of deter-
mining a bargaining representative, the section also makes the re-
quirement that an election be held when a strike is to be called by
the bargaining representative. 1 7 While other states have similar
provisions,' judicial -opinion has not been unanimous concerning
their validity. Alabama has held that a statute requiring a majority
vote for a strike was unconstitutional, the Court stating that "Each
individual employee has a right to strike for a legally justifiable
purpose, and such a right, of course, rests upon a minority as well
as a majority."3' Wisconsin, however, has ruled otherwise on the
ground that where a union has been certified as the bargaining
representative of an appropriate collective bargaining unit the
principle of majority rule may be validly applied. 14 0 On balance
this last view seems to embody the sounder result, both for practi-
135. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 7 (1) (a).
136. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 7 (1) (b).
137. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 7 (3).
138. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-5-6 (1953).
139. Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810, 827
(1944), app. dismissed, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
140. Hotel & E.R.l. Alliance v. Wis. Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 294
N.W. 634 (1941).
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cal and theoretical reasons. From the practical standpoint, a strike
not supported by a majority of employees will normally have little
chance of success. And while it is true that in North Dakota not
all employees will automatically be union members, and hence that
a substantial minority of employees often will not participate in the
making of union decisions, the requirement of an election is ap-
plicable only when the strike is to be called "by the bargaining
representative certified to represent employees." Thus the theoreti-
cal right of a minority of employees to strike despite the opposition
of a majority still persists here - so long, at least, until the minority
does not consist of members of the union certified as the bargaining
agent.
When once an election has been won by a union, the result is
prescribed by § 5 of the Act:
"Repesentatives designated or selected for the purpose of
collective bargaining... shall be exclusive representatives of all
the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment
or other conditions of employment."
During the committee deliberations on this portion of the statute,
union representatives advanced the proposition that they ought not
to be required to represent non-union employees, since such em-
ployees made no contribution to the cost of negotiating union
contracts and thus ought not to be entitled to benefits under them.
While there are elements of equity in this position, it was not
pressed very seriously and ultimately the section as drafted won
approval. In practice, it should be noted, at least one device - the
agency shop - has been developed as a union answer to this prob-
lem. The agency shop is an arrangement whereby employees who
are not union members but work in an establishment wherein a
union has been elected bargaining representatives of all employees
in that establishment are assessed, pursuant to the contract be-
tween employer and union, a service charge to defray the expense
to which the union is put in representing non-members.1' The
Attorney General of North Dakota has ruled that an agency shop
provision in a union-management contract does not violate the
"right-to-work" law of North Dakota.
142
When once certification as a bargaining representative has been
achieved, the Act provides that no further election may be held for
12 months. 14 3 One ground upon which a bargaining representative
141. See CCH Lab. L. Guide 2677.
142. Opinion No. 135, August 24, 1959.
143. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 7 (4).
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may lose such status should, however, be mentioned in this con-
nection. In 1959 North Dakota enacted a statute providing that:
"No person who has been convicted of any crime involving
moral turptude or a felony, excepting traffic violations, shall
serve in any official capacity or as any officer in any labor
union or labor organization in this state. No such person, nor
any labor union or labor organization in which he is an officer,
shall be qualified to act as a bargaining agent or representative
for employees in this state. Such disqualification shall termin-
ate whenever such officer is removed or resigns as an officer
in such labor union or labor organization."'1
4
Statutes on the same subject are found in Florida, New York and
Texas, 4 ' and the problem is also dealt with by § 504 of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.146 The Florida
legislation is in terms applicable only to union business agents and
denies them a license to act as such if ever convicted of a felony.
The Texas legislation applies to any union officer or union organ-
izer, but is inapplicable to persons whose rights of citizenship have
been restored. The New York enactment applies to "any officer or
agent" of certain waterfront unions, but contains an exemption
clause if the affected union officer has been subsequently pardoned
or has received a certificate of good conduct from the board of
parole to remove the disability of conviction.
Two points may be made in appraising the effect of the North
Dakota Union Officer Qualification act. First, no other statute on
this subject goes as far as the local enactment. Inevery other juris-
diction which has passed on this problem the disqualification from
holding office is based exclusively on conviction of a felony. In
every other jurisdiction save Florida a procedure for removal of
the bar is indicated. In view of the language employed in the
North Dakota act - "any crime involving moral turpitude or a
felony, excepting traffic violations" - relatively minor violations,
e.g., a conviction for disorderly conduct in a police magistrate's
court, would be as effective as a conviction for armed robbery in
imposing such a disqualification. 14 7 Moreover, no other enactment
penalizes the membership of the union as well as the individual
officer by terminating the union's status as a bargaining representa-
tive for such a circumstance. The North Dakota enactment might
144. N.D. Cent. Code § 34-01-16.
145. Fla. Stat. § 447.04 (1959); N.Y. Waterfront Commission Act of 1953 § 8, Mc-





146. 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 504 (Supp. 1960).
147. Of course the traditional distinction between criminal offenses which are malurrr
prohibitum and those which are matum in se might be invoked to mitigate the harshness
of the statute. But the specific exclusion of traffic offenses from the description of dis-
qualifying offenses would seem to militate against this construction.
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thus affect the interests of a number of completely innocent em-
ployees at the instant when those interests are most vulnerable, i.e.,
during the midst of a serious labor dispute.
Second, on a more technical basis the North Dakota statute also
invites examination. In Hill v. Florila,148 the Supreme Court of the
United States invalidated the Florida enactment relating to the
licensing of union business agents on the ground that it infringed
the "full freedom" of employees to choose representatives which
was secured by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. It is clear
that this decision, based on the federal doctrine of pre-emption,14
also applied to the Texas enactment and effectively foreclosed
.state regulation of the qualifications of union officials.
The most recent case on the point is De Veau v. Braisted,1o de-
-cided in 1960 by the United States Supreme Court. Since De Veatt
v. Braisted upheld the New York statute dealing with this subject,
an examination of the case seems indicated.
De Veau was secretary-treasurer of Local 1346 of the Inter-
national Longshoremen's Association. In 1920 he pleaded guilty
to grand larceny in New York and received a suspended sentence.
He never applied for or received a pardon or certificate of good
-conduct. In 1956 the district attorney of Richmond County, New
York, informed the president of De Veau's union that because of
De Veau's conviction the New York statute prohibited any person
from collecting dues on behalf of the union. The union then ousted
De Veau from office. De Veau brought an action for a declaratory
judgment to test the validity of the New York statute, contending
the New York act (1) violated § 7 of the National Labor-Manage-
ment Relations Act, (2) violated the policy of § 5-04 of the National
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, (3) was ex post
facto, and (4) a bill of attainder. He lost on every point.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority met the argument
based on Hill v. Florda and § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act by pointing to the legislative history of the New York statute,
which was unique. The legislation in question had been passed by
the State of New York pursuant to an interestate compact signed
by New York and New Jersey for the purpose of regulating what
the Court called a "notoriously serious situation" along the New
York waterfront. Pursuant to Art. 1, § 10 of the United States
Constitution this compact had been submitted to Congress for ap-
148. 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
149. See footnote 21, supra.
150. 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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proval, which it received. At the time this compact was submitted.
to Congress for approval, New York had already enacted the felony-
disqualification section as supplementary legislation to the inter-
state compact; and the act of Congress approving the compact
specifically provided that the consent of Congress "is hereby given
* . .to the carrying out and effectuation of said compact and enact-
ments in furtherance thereof." Frankfurter commented that "In
giving this authorization Congress was fully mindful of the specific
provisions of § 8.""'l He added, after a painstaking consideration
of the matter, that:
"The sum of these considerations is that it would offend reason
to attribute to Congress a purpose to pre-empt the state regulation
contained in § 8. The decision in Hill v. Florida .. .in no wise
obstructs this conclusion. An element most persuasive here, con-
gressional approval of the heart of the state legislative program,
explicitly brought to its attention, was not present in that case."' -
This language would appear to indicate that Hill v. Florida is still
effective law and that the National Labor Relations Act-of 1947 thus
pre-empts state legislation of the type found in North Dakota.
X. ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
The greatest difficulty encountered in attempting to adapt the
National Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 to local usage
came in connection with the fonnulation of procedures for admini-
stration. On the federal level there exists elaborate machinery for
the purpose. North Dakota, however, has not yet developed a unit-
ary administration of its labor statutes, and divides the task of
administering them between two separate agencies: the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, which controls the unemployment com-
pensation division, state employment service, and various safety
agencies, and the office of the Commissioner of Agriculture and
Labor, which collects employment statistics, investigates labor
disputes, enforces the child labor laws, and also administers pro-
visions relating to minimum wages and hours of work for women
and minors.
At the primary election of 1960 the electorate of the state ap-
proved a Constitutional Amendment allowing the establishment of
a separate department of labor to be administered by a "public
official, who may be either elected or appointed." 5 ' Implementation
of this provision was recommended to the 1961 session of the Legis-
151. 363 U.S. at 151.
152. 363 U.S. at 154-55.
153. N.D. Laws 1959, c. 437.
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lative Assembly by the Special Committee to Study Labor Laws,
with the thought in mind of vesting administration of the new Act
in the newly-created department. However, the draft legislation
submitted for this purpose encountered difficulties, and although
several substitutes were offered the measure failed to gain approval.
The North Dakota Labor-Management Relations Act had been
drafted with the possibility of such an outcome in mind, and in
consequence was readily susceptible of an amendment which placed
initial administration of the Act in the office of the Commissioner
of Agriculture and Labor.
A second phase of the problem involved the extent of the author-
ity the administering authority was to possess, and was complicated
by an issue relating to the scope of judicial review. North Dakota
possesses a well-drafted Administrative Agencies Practice Act,' 4
and the initial draft of the North Dakota Labor-Management Re-
lations Act therefore referred most questions of administrative
practice to that statute. However, opposition to this solution de-
veloped on the ground that it made the findings of fact entered by
the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor in the case of proceed-
ings under the Act conclusive if found by the reviewing court to be
supported by substantial evidence.' An additional ground of ob-
jection lay in the fact that under the Federal Act the NLRB is
authorized to enter awards of back pay to employees discharged as
the result of an unfair labor practice. The grant of such authority
to the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor was opposed on
several grounds, among them being the argument that such juris-
diction would deprive parties of the traditional right of trial by
jury and also that it amounted to furnishing counsel at public ex-
pense to private litigants. 15A In consequence the initial draft of the
statute was amended to delete language authorizing such awards
of back pay on the part of the Commissioner, while a new section
was inserted in the Act to provide that "Any person injured in his
person or property by reason of the commission of an unfair labor
practice as defined in this Act may sue therefor in the district court
and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of
the suit.1"'
In substance, the argument over these provisions, which was very
ably conducted and-from the Committee standpoint-of a critical
character, involved a choice between an administrative as opposed
154. N.D. Cent. Code c. 28-32.
155. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-19.
155A. See Mont. Rev. Code § 41-1302 (1947).
156. N.D. Labor-Management Relations Act § 11.
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to a judicial method of enforcing the provisions of the Act. The
argument in favor of reliance upon administrative procedures was
based on the factors of informality, speed of adjudication, and the
comparative lack of expense customarily associated with admini-
strative methods. The argument in favor of a broad scope of judicial
review stressed the greater impressiveness and dignity of the pro-
ceedings, the fact legally-trained personnel were available in the
district courts, and the greater procedural protection the judicial
system affords litigants. In the end, the latter factors were of great-
est weight in the judgment of the majority of the Committee, and
the procedures for review of decisions entered by the Commissioner
of Agriculture and Labor in cases arising under the Act were ac-
cordingly broadened.
This outcome, while allowing the use of administrative procedures
in connection with a labor dispute and thus permitting compara-
tively minor disputes to be adjusted rapidly on an administrative
basis, nevertheless appears to place the true center of gravity in
most serious labor disputes in the district courts. Thus, § 8 of the
Act actually gives the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor a
distinctly restricted function. When a charge of unfair labor practice
is made to him, he is initially required to make an informal investi-
gation-a provision designed to emphasize the use of conciliatory
procedures in labor disputes. If the informal investigation indicates
that an unfair labor practice is occurring, the Commissioner, in the
language of § 8 of the Act:
"shall have power to issue and cause to be served . . . a written
specification of the issues which are to be considered and deter-
mined. If, upon the evidence, the commissioner shall be of the
opinion that any person named in the written specifications has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, he
shall issue and cause to be served upon such person an order
requiring such person to cease' and desist from such unfair labor
practice. If the order is not obeyed, the commissioner shall have
the authority to apply to the appropriate district court for an in-
junction under the provisions of chapter 32-06."
The point to be remembered is that on appeal the Commissioner's
findings of fact are open to re-litigation. Section 10 of the Act pro-
vides explicitly that the findings of the commissioner on appeal
"shall not be entitled to affirmative weight.157 Thus, while the de-
157. In every other respect, administrative proceedings under the act are governed by
ND. Cent. Code c. 28-32. Thus, although it is the Commissioner of Agriculture and
Labor who issues the written specification of the issues to be considered and determined
in an unfair labor practice proceeding, under N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-08 the complain-
ing party is regarded as a party in interest, In re Wheatland, 77 N.D. 194, 42 N.W.2d
321 (1950), and hence entitled to appeal. N.D. Cent. Code § 28-32-15.
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cision of the Commissioner will undoubtedly often be effective in
settling disputes, serious cases are open to wide judical re-examina-
tion; and where it is anticipated that an appeal will be taken the
proceedings before the Commissioner will be of less importance
than the subsequent district court hearing. Moreover, the import-
ance of the judicial system in the enforcement of the Act is further
emphasized by the fact that, as already noted, the Act incorporates
a general right of suit for damages resulting from a breach of its
provisions. Coupled with the provisions relating to equitable
relief,"' this is believed to be adequate to ensure effective and
meaningful enforcement of the statute.
XI. CONCLUSION
While the new statute represents a striking development in the
labor law of this state, a few more generalized comments appear
desirable.
It should be pointed out that the Act was designed to deal with
genuinely serious situations: the case wherein one side over-
reached the other in a truly significant fashion. Thus in the far more
prevalent case where employer and employees are engaged in work-
ing out a bargain about wages, hours, and working conditions in
reasonable fashion, making a genuine attempt to reach agreement,
the Labor-Management Relations Act will have little application.
Thus it may be suggested that the decision to file an unfair labor
practice charge on behalf of a client should be carefully considered.
A lawsuit is rarely an adequate substitute for a voluntary agreement,
too technical an approach to the problems of labor-management
negotiations may well be self-defeating, and the standard authorities
in the field urge patience, restraint, and an understanding of the
other fellow's point of view.159
The Act also has some notable omissions. A few of them may be
pointed out:
1. The six-months period for filing an unfair labor practice
charge prescribed by the Federal Act is not incorporated in the
North Dakota Act. Thus the conventional statutes of limitation
apply to judicial proceedings in which enforcement of the Act is
sought. Where equitable relief is sought, it is believed that the
potential applicability of the defense of laches should be noted in
the event proceedings have been unduly delayed.
158. Observe that it is the Commissioner of Agriculture and Labor who possesses the
authority to ask for injunctive relief under N.D. Cent. Code c. 32-06, rather than the
employer of the union. As to the latter parties, N.D. Cent. Code c. 34-08 is applicable.
159. See Plock, supra note 70, at 476-77.
[Vol. 37
1961] N. D. LABOR-MIANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr
2. The Act does not contain any declaration of policy. This was,
it should be noted, an intentional omission. No less than three
declarations of public policy are incorporated in the labor statutes
of North Dakota already,"' the Act conforms to these in a general
fashion, and the Committee preferred to concentrate on provisions
of more direct substantive character.1tl
3. The Act is not applicable to agricultural labor. While the
Special Committee to Study Labor Laws investigated this subject,
particularly so far as it involved migratory workers, it was apparent
that the probems of agricultural employment were in many respects
of a fundamentally different character from those encountered in
the case of urban workers.
It should be noted that recent studies have indicated a serious
need for remedial action in this field.1 2 The situation of many
migratory agricultural employees is such that they often lack ade-
quate educational opportunities, housing, and income."' This is a
problem which crosses state boundaries and is thus not entirely
susceptible of remedy on the state level. However, progress in some
areas would nevertheless appear feasible. To illustrate, at the pre-
sent time workmen's compensation for farm workers is optional with
the individual farm employer in North Dakota. G4 Yet agriculture is
160. N.D. Cent. Code §§ 34-08-02, 34-09-01, 34-10-01. Several other sections in c.
34-09 of the Code make use of the "'public policy" terminology also.
161. It is worth noting that when the current edition of the North Dakota Code was
being prepared in 1960, the committee on revision, deleted as obsolete a good many
declarations of public policy which had found their way into the 1943 revision. How-
ever, no such action was taken in the case of the statutes dealing with labor.
162. See Migratory Labor: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of
the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
on S. 1085, S. 1778, S. 2141, and S. 2498, Bills Relating to Migratory Labor; Committee
Print, The Migrant Farm Worker in America, Prepared for the Subcommittee on Migratory
Labor of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess.; Educational Assistance to Migrant Agricultural Employees and Their Children:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Education of the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 2864, A Bill to Provide Certain
Payments to Assist in Providing Improved Educational Opportunities for Children of Mig-
rant Agricultural Employees, and S. 2865, A Bill to Provide Grants for Adult Eduation for
Migrant Agricultural Employees.
163. The average income per migrant laborer family was recently reported as $2,208
as compared to the median average income of all U.S. households of $4,873. Reporting on
the United States Department of Labor's position regarding enactment of federal legisla-
tion to aid in education of children of migratory agricultural workers, The Acting Sec-
retary of Labor stated in 1960: "Under the best of conditions the education migrant
children receive at present is piecemeal, lacking in continuity and orderly development.
The exact proportions of the educational problems with regard to these children is difficult
to assess, since migrant children aften are not carried on school district census rolls . . .
Another indication of the nature of this problem is found in a recent study by the Wage
and Hour and Public Contracts Division of this Department, of the educational attain-
ment of 1,673 migrant children under the age of 16 found working during school hours
contrary to the Fair Labor Standards Act. This report 'showed that 68 percent were
enrolled in grades below normal for their ages. A comparison of the education of these
children by age indicates that the percentage retarded educationally increases as the age
increases. For example, 87 percent of the 15-year-olds in the survey were in grades below
normal for their age, while 40 percent of the 8-year-olds were behind in the grade in which
they would normally be expected to be enrolled."
164. See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 65-01-02 (4) (a), 65-04-29.
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the third most hazardous occupation in the United States, only
slightly less dangerous than construction work or farming. 1"5 When
a farm worker in this state sustains a personal injury it is thus tn-
certain whether he will be able to obtain workmen's compensation
for it. If he fails to do so the normal outcome will often be a per-
sonal injury action against the employer which will cost substantial
damages if the employee wins,"' and leave the employee in many
cases a public charge if he loses.' 1 7 For this reason it would seem
that extension of workmen's compensation coverage to farm employ-
ment on a full-scale basis would be readily justifiable. In addition
it would constitute direct and immediate protection to life and limb.
The Act does not deal with problems of racial and religious dis-
crimination in employment. North Dakota is a state wherein such
problems appear to be relatively few. Neverthless, the state contains
a substantial Indian population and it is apparent that at least some
prospect of the full political integration of this group into the state's
legal system exists.' Consideration of their potential future needs
might readily make such protection desirable. 6 '
Situations such as the foregoing are not actually instances where-
in the interests of labor and management are embroiled in conflict
of the traditional nature. It is thus apparent that there are many
cases in which the men on both Sides of the bargaining table have
a joint opportunity to work toward the mutually advantageous goal
of making the state a better place in which to live. This, it is sub-
mitted, is the true significance of the new legislation in North
Dakota.
165. Committee Print, The Migrant Farm Worker in America, supra note 162, at 70.
166. See Rosebear v. Anderson; 143 F.Supp. 721 (D.N.D. 1956).
167. Since the public welfare statutes in this state require a year of continuous residence
before assistance may be given, most migratory agricultural workers fall outside their scope.
See N.D. Cent. Code § 50-10A-03 (3).
168. N.D. Const. § 203 was amended in 1958 to allow the state legislature to accept
a federal grant of jurisdiction over Indian reservations in North Dakota. N.D. Laws 1959,
c. 430.
169. Eighteen states plus Puerto Rico have adopted such legislation in the past two
decades. Alaska Comp. Laws Ann., Tit. 43, 'c. 5; Cal. Labor Code §§ 1410-1432; Colo.
Rev. Stat., Art. 24, c. 80 (1953); Conn. Gen. Stat., Tit. 31, c. 563 (1958); Burns
Ind. Stat. Ann., Tit. 40, c. 23 (Supp. 1959); Kan. Gen. Stat. c. 44, Art. 10 (Supp.
1959); Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 6, § 56, c. 151b §§ 1-10; Mich. Pub. Acts 1955, c. 251;
Minn. Stat. Ann., c. 363; N.J. Stat., Tit. 18, c. 25; N.M. Stat., c. 59, Art. 4 (1953);
N.Y. Consol. Laws, c. 18, Art. 15; Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4112.01-4112.99; Ore. Rev.
Stat. §§ 659.010-659.115, 659.990; Prdon's Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, c. 17; R.I. Gen.
Laws, Tit. 28, c. 5; Wash. Rev. Code c. 49.60; Wis. Stat., C. 111, sub-chapter II;
Puerto Rico Laws, Tit. 29, § 146. The Alaska statute is a simple and apparently
workable one.
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